An expanded marketing proposal from AYMI for United Musculoskeletal Partners — building the platform-level patient acquisition engine to match a platform-level operating model. Across sixty locations. Three states. Two-hundred-and-thirty-two physicians. One unified system.
A six-frame creative preview accompanies this proposal — identity-neutral, HIPAA-aware, built for the platform's tone.
Creative preview →United Musculoskeletal Partners is one of the largest musculoskeletal MSOs in the country — and in the last four years it has grown by acquiring excellent practices. The next stage of value isn't another acquisition. It's whether the practices already inside the platform compound on each other.
You stepped into the VP, Digital Marketing seat in April. Two months in. Reporting to Daniel Goldberg. Replacing a function that was, by your own playbook at MDVIP, built from scratch across a distributed physician network. You know exactly what platform-level patient acquisition looks like when it works — because you built it once already, in a 1,400-physician concierge primary-care network, with shared compliance constraints and shared attribution complexity.
Now you have a harder version of the same problem. Sixty clinic locations. Two-hundred-and-thirty-two subspecialty physicians. Three states. Fourteen ASC brands. One-and-a-half million patient visits a year. A live MSO-level CRM and Marketing Cloud stack. Welsh Carson Fund XIII at year four-and-a-half of a five-to-seven-year hold. And, in November, the OrthoTexas rebrand — five Texas practices unifying into one brand across twenty-two DFW locations, with no luxury of a slow ramp.
This proposal is a working document, not a generic agency pitch. It is structured around the channels you already run, the practices you already own, the rebrand you are already running toward, and the platform-level acquisition engine that has to exist before WCAS reads the next valuation memo.
A summary of the operating shift this engagement runs against. Each axis is recoverable inside ninety days; the platform-level shift compounds over a twelve-month arc.
Benchmarks pulled from AYMI's healthcare and multi-location case-study set (§17). Targets assume the platform engine is built into the OrthoTexas launch window. All figures are directional; the scoping call sets the contractual targets.
UMP's growth engine succeeds only when it lands with the C-suite, the digital function, and the affiliated physician-owners. Each cares about a different metric. The platform has to make all three true at once.
Accountable to the sponsor for platform revenue growth, payer-mix optimization, and a defensible marketing infrastructure that survives a secondary-sale narrative. They read marketing in dashboards, not creative.
What they need from this engagement: platform-level reporting, market-share by metro, commercial-mix trend, ROI defensible at the board level.
Two months in, replacing a function that just turned over. You know what platform acquisition looks like (MDVIP, 1,400+ physicians, distributed network, compliance-aware). You need a partner who can move at MSO speed, build the attribution model, and turn you into the force-multiplier the C-suite hired you to be inside the OrthoTexas window.
What you need from this engagement: embedded execution, an attribution system that survives a board review, and a roadmap your first ninety days have already started executing against.
They retained clinical autonomy. The platform promised them practice growth. They don't care about brand awareness — they care about Tuesday's schedule, the joint-replacement consult that converted, and whether the new spine partner is full inside ninety days.
What they need from this engagement: location-specific, subspecialty-specific new patient volume — visible, weekly, defensible to their own practice partners.
The single highest-leverage build inside the first twelve months. Every other workstream is a feeder into, or a downstream beneficiary of, this engine.
Today, each affiliated practice runs its own marketing — its own site, its own SEO, its own paid spend, its own analytics. The platform layer on top of them is largely organizational, not operational. That model worked for the acquisition phase. It does not scale into the value-creation phase the sponsor needs to see.
The engine we propose is one unified acquisition system that activates at the location level but learns at the platform level. The intent — subspecialty × insurer × ZIP code — is the unit of activation. The attribution — click to booked appointment to kept visit to surgical conversion — is the unit of measurement. The output is a dashboard the VP function owns, the C-suite reads, and the physician-owners trust.
Practice-site audit, EMR connector map, paid spend census by market, compliance baseline (HIPAA/HITECH, Stark/AKS), OrthoTexas readiness gap, attribution model state.
Subspecialty × insurer × ZIP across GA, TX, CO. Spend reallocation model. OrthoTexas day-one launch plan. KPI hierarchy from physician-owner to board.
A platform creative system — identity-neutral, HIPAA-aware, compliance-cleared — that flexes by subspecialty and market. The system is the asset, not any single ad.
Server-side attribution (Meta CAPI, Google Enhanced Conversions, PHI scrubbed), pixel governance, UTM convention, OrthoTexas go-live, every location traceable.
Monthly spend reallocation. Quarterly subspecialty rebalance. Recruitment funnel woven in. Lifecycle and downstream capture optimized. The dashboard reads cleaner every quarter.
Sixty locations across three states, and from outside the platform there is no visible coordination of paid acquisition. The Resurgens, Panorama, and AOA brands each look like independent, separately-managed Google and Meta presences. The adKlinic creative converted you — which tells us the funnel is working at the platform level. The activation across sixty locations is the gap.
One platform-managed Meta and Google account structure with location-level ad sets, subspecialty-level creative, and a shared insurer/payer angle library. Server-side conversion APIs everywhere (Meta CAPI, Google Enhanced Conversions) with PHI scrubbed at source. One UTM convention. One attribution model end-to-end. Spend reallocates monthly to the highest-ROAS market × subspecialty combinations — not annually, not by gut.
Days 1–30: spend census across all sixty locations, attribution audit, pixel and CAPI rebuild on the highest-volume markets. Days 31–60: consolidated account structure live in three pilot markets (one per state); legacy spend gradually rerouted. Days 61–90: the OrthoTexas pre-launch creative bank live across all twenty-two DFW locations, first reallocation report to Daniel.
Each practice site is its own island. Resurgens.com ranks for Atlanta-area ortho terms. Panoramaortho.com ranks for Denver-metro terms. The five Texas practices each compete with each other on DFW-area subspecialty terms. None of them rank as a portfolio — and none of them surface for the most valuable searches: subspecialty + insurer + ZIP. Goldberg's own December 2025 post acknowledges this gap explicitly.
One SEO architecture, shared across all practice-site brands. Subspecialty-by-condition pages, location-by-physician pages, payer-by-procedure pages — each one schema-marked (Physician, MedicalSpecialty, MedicalProcedure, AcceptedPaymentMethod). Google Business Profile coverage at every location, owned at the platform layer with practice-level activation. Content programs that compound — explainer libraries, procedural FAQs, payer guides — published once and syndicated across the practice sites. This is the Behavioral Health Network playbook applied to musculoskeletal.
Audit, intent-map build, GBP coverage and ownership rationalization across all sixty locations, the first cohort of subspecialty + condition + ZIP pages live on the pilot practice sites. The OrthoTexas SEO architecture is built in parallel and ready for the November cutover.
Marketo and Salesforce Marketing Cloud are already inside the platform — built into your own working repertoire. AthenaHealth is the EMR across most of the portfolio. The wiring between them, for patient lifecycle, is the missing layer. Patients complete an episode of care and the marketing function loses them. Downstream services (PT, imaging, second-opinion, second-joint replacement) are underserved by reactivation programs.
Episode-of-care lifecycle: pre-visit confirmation, post-visit follow-up, post-op PT prompts, imaging reminders, second-event nurture. Every email and SMS is HIPAA-aware, PHI-scrubbed in transit, and triggered on EMR signals — not on guesses. Reactivation programs by subspecialty (a knee-replacement patient has different downstream economics than a sports-medicine patient). The compliant lift on commercially-insured bookings is the metric we govern to.
Marketo + SFMC + EMR connector audit, episode-of-care map across the top five subspecialties, first reactivation flow live on a pilot practice (likely Panorama in CO, where the JV hospital + ASC + PT integration is tightest). Measurement reads weekly inside the platform dashboard.
Online scheduling is live across the portfolio. Goldberg's own published numbers: over sixty percent of online-booked appointments are new patients, sixty percent commercially insured. That is the top-of-funnel working as designed. The next leg — from booked consult, to attended consult, to consult-to-procedure conversion — is not yet a published metric. That's where the platform value lives.
CRO across the full post-click journey: subspecialty-specific landing experiences, insurer-verification CTAs that don't leak intent, pre-visit content that prepares the patient to be a high-conversion consult, intake forms that capture the data the surgeon needs before the patient walks in. The conversion model has to be different by subspecialty — a joint-replacement consultation funnel does not behave like a sports-medicine consultation funnel. The platform makes the difference legible and ownable.
Booking-flow audit across all ten practice brands, first instrumented version of the consult-to-procedure conversion rate by subspecialty, first wave of CRO experiments live on the two highest-volume practice sites.
UMP grows in two ways. By acquiring practices, and by adding subspecialty surgeons into the existing platform. The recruitment narrative — physician-owned MSO, retained autonomy, sponsor-backed growth model, ASC ownership and value-based-care upside — is one of the strongest in the segment. It is also, today, undermarketed. Recruitment marketing exists as an HR function more than a growth function.
A recruitment funnel that runs alongside the patient acquisition engine — same compliance posture, same analytics rigor, different audience. LinkedIn-led, subspecialty-segmented, anchored on the platform's value-creation story for surgeon-owners. Built in collaboration with Audrey Grolig's people function so the funnel feeds an interview process that's ready for volume. The KPI is provider pipeline by subspecialty by market.
Recruitment narrative architecture, LinkedIn paid + organic build, first subspecialty pilots (likely spine and sports medicine, the two highest-growth subspecialties), measurement aligned to the candidate-to-LOI funnel.
In November 2026, five legacy practices — All-Star Orthopaedics, AOA Orthopedic Specialists, North Texas Orthopedics & Spine Center, Orthopedic Associates, and OrthoTexas — unify into OrthoTexas. Twenty-two DFW locations. Seventy-plus physicians. One new brand. The legacy patient bases of all five practices have to be retained, the new brand has to launch with regional awareness, and the SEO inheritance of five domains has to be consolidated without a traffic collapse.
A launch playbook that runs in three layers. Layer one: continuity — every legacy patient touched by mail and SMS, every legacy domain 301'd correctly, every Google Business Profile migrated cleanly. Layer two: awareness — pre-launch DMA media buy, post-launch local media partnerships, surgeon-led content in the regional press. Layer three: acquisition — day-one paid and SEO coverage across all twenty-two locations, OrthoTexas creative system flexed by subspecialty, the platform attribution model live from minute one.
October–November build window. Continuity infrastructure (domain redirects, GBP migration, patient communications). Launch creative system. Pre-launch awareness wave begins six weeks out. Day-one paid coverage staged and ready for activation the morning of cutover.
The creative that converted you — "the diagnosis" — is part of adKlinic, AYMI's named healthcare-only execution arm. It exists because medical-practice marketing has compliance, claim, and identity constraints that punish generalists. Twenty-two specialty playbooks. Built for orthopedic practices specifically, among others.
adKlinic is the operating arm of this engagement. It is how the work above actually gets executed — by people who have only ever worked in healthcare, against compliance gates that are non-negotiable, with playbooks that have been pressure-tested across twenty-two specialty verticals.
Every ad is built HIPAA/HITECH-aware. No identifiable patients in creative. No outcome claims without substantiation. Internal counsel review built into the production cycle, not bolted on at the end.
Meta CAPI, Google Enhanced Conversions, with PHI scrubbed at source. We never let health-identifier data into a pixel payload. The attribution model is built to withstand a counsel-led audit.
Joint replacement, spine, sports medicine, hand, foot & ankle, sports surgery — each one has its own intent map, its own audience logic, its own creative library, its own conversion rhythm. Not a generic "ortho" approach.
Business Associate Agreement structure ready from day one with UMP's General Counsel (Jessica Holland). Every vendor and tool in the stack vetted for HIPAA posture and downstream-data flow.
Every dashboard, every KPI, every reallocation is logged and defensible. WCAS board memos are written from this data; the data has to be ready to be written about.
Built around exactly the problem UMP has — many locations, many brands, many subspecialties, one platform. The org structure is designed to activate at the practice level while learning at the platform level.
There are two weak alternatives to this engagement. A generalist agency learning orthopedics on your dollar — losing six months and several million in opportunity cost to the learning curve. Or a small healthcare shop that can run one practice well but can't scale to sixty without collapsing under its own ops. The third option is this proposal.
The engagement shapes describe the team, the operating tempo, and the surface area covered — not the dollar figure. We'd rather decide together what's in scope first, then price it once the answer is real.
A pilot-tier engagement focused on two-to-three pilot markets and one channel pillar (most likely paid acquisition + local SEO across the OrthoTexas footprint). For proving the model before platform-wide rollout.
The platform-wide build of the Multi-Location Patient Acquisition Engine across GA, TX, and CO. Includes paid acquisition, local SEO, lifecycle, surgical CRO, OrthoTexas launch leadership, and the platform dashboard. The shape this proposal was written for.
The Growth System plus physician recruitment marketing as a co-equal funnel, full brand authority architecture across the portfolio, and an embedded executive growth director seat working directly inside UMP's marketing function. For the secondary-sale narrative arc.
The investment for each shape is held for the scoping call — we'd rather decide together what's in scope first, then price it once the answer is real. Media spend, software, and any creator or content production fees pass through and are billed separately from the retainer.
UMP is in a window — four-and-a-half years into a five-to-seven-year sponsor hold, with the November OrthoTexas cutover as a forcing function and a newly installed VP, Digital Marketing function that can credibly own a platform build. The Growth System shape is what matches that window.
The Foundation shape is correct only if there's a structural reason to prove DFW before going platform-wide. The Full Demand OS shape is correct if recruitment marketing is moving inside the digital function this fiscal year rather than next. Defaulting to Growth System is the right call until those two questions resolve on the scoping call.
One thing to flag honestly: you are two months in. Even with the right partner, a platform build of this scope rewards a phased rollout — pilot markets in the first ninety days, OrthoTexas as the proving event in November, full portfolio coverage by month nine. The proposal is built around that arc, not against it.
These are AYMI engagements with the highest structural fit to a multi-location, multi-brand, compliance-bound healthcare platform. Behavioral Health Network is the closest mechanical match.
The exact mechanical match. Replace "condition" with "subspecialty" and "insurance-verified" with "commercial-payer-mix" and this is the brief for UMP.
Speaks directly to the scale-versus-local-conversion tension UMP is sitting on across sixty locations.
Modeled to the stakeholder each conversion actually depends on — relevant to UMP's three-constituent dynamic (board, VP function, physician-owners).
Demonstrates HIPAA-compliant, intent-tiered paid acquisition at scale — measured to approved members, not clicks.
UMP has spent four years building the largest musculoskeletal MSO in the country. The next twelve months decide whether the platform compounds — or whether it remains a portfolio of practices that happen to share a parent. The Multi-Location Patient Acquisition Engine is the artifact that makes the difference. The OrthoTexas launch is the proving moment. The VP Digital Marketing function is the operating layer that makes both real.
Forty-five minutes. We walk through the six open questions in §19, pressure-test the engagement shape against your budget structure and OrthoTexas timeline, and lock the first ninety days of work into your calendar. Reply directly to the email this proposal arrived under, or pick a time at aymi.agency/contact.
A six-frame creative preview accompanies this proposal — three patient-acquisition concepts and three platform-authority concepts.
Creative preview →